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 This research investigates how individuals’ structural positions affect their justice 
perceptions of income distribution. Several previous studies have found the effect of 
socio-economic status along with other factors on people’s preference for how much 
more high-prestige occupations should be paid than low-prestige occupations. However, 
there is not much effort on exploring theoretical explanations for those empirical 
findings. To provide explanations for the effect of structural position on perceptions of 
income inequality, two potential theoretical perspectives are examined: self-interest 
theory and Wegener’s illusory perception theory. The study uses Chinese General Social 
Survey data to investigate the impact of individuals’ income on the justice gap, which 
measures the injustice they perceived from general income distribution. The result 
suggests that high income people tend to perceive less injustice than low income people, 
supporting the self-interest theory perspective. Pay satisfaction is found to partially 
explain the effect of income on the perceived injustice. It’s concluded that individuals’ 
perceptions of social inequality are distorted depending on their structural positions along 
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Increasing economic inequality worldwide has raised many concerns, particularly 
given its effects on various dimensions of society such as educational achievement, 
health, voting and violent crime (see Neckerman and Torche 2007). One argument is that 
people’s acceptance of inequality has adjusted to the increasing level of inequality, as 
they tend to internalize the existing inequality and view it as justified (Jost et al. 2003; 
Trump 2013). As a result, individuals are more tolerant of a large gap between the rich 
and the poor, underestimate the existing inequality, and perceive less injustice. 
Individuals’ justice perceptions have been connected to specific emotional and behavioral 
consequences. For instance, an employee who is continuously treated unfairly and 
underpaid will have a lower level of job satisfaction level and be more likely to quit in 
order to decrease the cognitive dissonance that they experience (Festinger 1957; Adams 
1963, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 1973). Similarly, people’s judgment of the 
fairness of the income distribution, which relates to their general view of social 
inequality, will impact the public’s acceptance of social inequality, and consequently any 
demand for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Therefore, it is critical that we 
understand how people perceive a distribution situation and how the feeling of injustice is 
generated. 
These two questions bring us to the theories of distributive justice, which focus on 
the preference for normative allocation principles, the situations where a certain 
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distribution is perceived as unfair, and individuals’ reactions toward perceived injustice 
(Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). Most distributive justice research investigates individuals’ 
perceptions, emotions, and behaviors in a local allocation situation where reward is 
allocated among two or more individuals, which may or may not include the perceiver1. 
When the perceiver directly experiences or observes an allocation, he or she will develop 
a local justice perception of how fair or unfair the allocation is. In contrast, global justice 
perception refers to individuals’ perception of a general distribution that they do not 
directly experience. For local justice perception, much effort has been devoted to 
studying the effects of various socio-demographic or contextual factors such as sex, 
educational attainment, interaction with ingroup or outgroup members and so on, but not 
for the general fairness perceived by individuals of distribution in the society as a whole 
(see Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). Studies on global justice perception usually aggregate 
individuals’ judgment of the income distribution to a macro-level index, and make 
comparisons across societies with different cultures or dominating political ideologies 
(e.g., Kelley and Evans 1993; Jasso 1999; Osberg and Smeeding 2006). There seems to 
be a gap between these two threads of distributive justice research, one focusing on how 
individual difference affects local justice perception but overlooking global justice 
perception, and the other focusing on global justice perception but only by comparing 
across different cultural and political ideologies. What is clearly absent is an 
understanding of the individual and contextual factors that influence people’s perception 
of the income distribution in their own society.  
                                                           
1 The perceiver is the actor who makes assessment of the allocation situation, and this person can be the 
recipient of the reward, the allocator, or just a third-party observer (see Hegtvedt 2006). 
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In order to bridge the gap, the present research examines whether and how the 
difference in individuals’ social structural positions affects their perception of social 
inequality, specifically, the justice perception of the income distribution. Several studies 
have found the effect of socio-economic status along with other factors on people’s 
preference for how much more high-prestige occupations should be paid than low-
prestige occupations (e.g., Kelly and Evans 1993; Kiatpongsan and Norton 2014). 
However, there is not so much effort on exploring theoretical explanations for those 
empirical findings. This study focuses on testing potential theories and providing 
explanations for the effect of structural position on perceptions of income inequality. The 
sections below start with an elaboration of justice perception and justice gap, followed by 
the discussion of a controversy between two theoretical perspectives regarding the pattern 
in which the justice evaluation varies by social positions. Then the following section 
presents the research method and analysis results. The paper concludes with the 
discussion of theoretical and empirical implications and potential gaps for future research 




THEORIES OF JUSTICE PERCEPTION AND JUSTICE GAP 
2.1 JUSTICE PERCEPTION 
Justice perception, sometimes also referred to as justice evaluation, is the 
subjective assessment of how fair the perceiver thinks the situation is. The perceiver is 
the actor who observes and evaluates a given outcome distribution, procedure or 
treatment. Scholars in the justice area, especially those that focus their work on local 
justice perception, distinguish between first-party perception, where the perceiver is 
evaluating his or her own experience or outcome, and third-party perception, in which the 
perceiver is not the recipient of the outcome or the target of the treatment. The present 
study examines individuals’ justice perception of the income distribution, in which the 
perceiver is also involved since they are members of the society. The social distribution is 
experienced by and affects the perceiver, but it’s not a local, personal justice experience. 
Thus it cannot be simply categorized as a first-party or third-party perception situation. 
Previous studies find that individuals are biased by the egocentric tendency when 
making first-party justice evaluations. People tend to overestimate their input, think that 
they deserve more than counterparts who make exactly the same contribution, and 
perceive more injustice in their own outcome than in others’ (Ross and Sicoly 1979; 
Messick and Sentis 1979). Nevertheless, people’s justice perception is not solely driven 
by the egocentric tendency. As part of the foundation for studies on third-party justice 
perception, it’s argued that people do care about the justice experiences of others, 
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especially those with whom they have interpersonal relationships (Tyler and Dawes 
1993; Mikula et al. 1998). In experiments where reward is allocated after a particular 
group task, friends as partners tend to prefer equal distribution regardless of their 
performance. In conditions where partners are total strangers, subjects with higher 
performance prefer equity, i.e. reward is proportional to task performance, and prefer 
equality when they perform poorly (Austin 1980; Kayser and Lamm 1981). This finding 
reveals individuals’ tendency to favor friends, even when this means sacrificing their own 
immediate interest. Other studies (Kahneman et al. 1986; Turillo et al. 2002) find that 
individuals, as third-party perceivers, think negatively of actors who are unfair to others 
having no relationship with the perceivers, and are willing to punish these unfair actors 
even at a cost to their own resources.   
The egocentric tendency and the tendency to care for others are both expected to 
play a role in the perception of income distribution. When assessing the overall fairness 
of the distribution, individuals not only need to consider others’ justice experiences but 
also take their own experiences into account, as they are embedded in the general 
distribution. The present study examines whether individuals’ positions in the system 
affects their justice perception of that system. 
Although this study looks at income distribution, justice perception is definitely 
not limited to material reward distribution. Justice researchers study both distributive 
justice and procedural justice. Distributive justice, which started off as the emphasis of 
early justice research, is about the allocation of benefits or burdens to recipients, 
perceived using certain normative justice principles: equality, equity or needs (see Cook 
and Hegtvedt 1983). Procedural justice regards the fairness of the procedure through 
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which distribution decisions are made and also the treatment one receives (Leventhal et 
al. 1980; Tyler and Lind 1992). People can perceive injustice in the allocation of not just 
monetary rewards, but also burdens such as punishment or workload. Furthermore, the 
feeling of injustice can emerge not because of the allocation per se, but from the 
procedure during which the allocation is made or the differential treatment toward 
recipients. For the purpose of this research, the following discussion of justice perception 
will focus only on distributive justice. 
Theoretical and empirical efforts in distributive justice studies have been devoted 
to answering three central questions: What do people think is just? How do people 
perceive injustice? And how do people respond to perceived injustice? The major 
theories of justice consistently define injustice as the discrepancy between what one 
should get and what one actually gets (See Berger et al. 1972; Walster, Berscheid, and 
Walster 1973; Homans 1974, 1976). Justice perceptions result from the comparison 
between “what is” and “what ought to be” in various situations. Typically, people can 
make comparisons between a particular distribution with some referential standards or 
compare one’s outcome with another specific person, with general others, or with one’s 
own past experience. The just amount is generally determined by which distribution 
principle the perceiver thinks is relevant to the situation. Perceivers’ individual 
characteristics, beliefs, and motivations, together with some contextual factors, influence 
their choice of relevant distribution rules, and thus impact their justice perception (see 
Hegtvedt 2006). One assumption underlying the justice theory is that individuals have a 
universal longing for justice and the discrepancy between the actual and the expected just 
distribution will cause distress and tension (Adams 1965). And people will try to restore 
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justice, either psychologically or behaviorally, to relieve the distress and tension stemmed 
from perceived injustice (Adams 1965; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster 1973).  
However, answering the three central questions above is not enough to fully 
understand justice perception. Jasso (1978) proposed questions about the magnitude of 
injustice, asking whether people perceive different degrees of injustice and how it can be 
reified as the deviation from the perfect justice point in the perceiver’s mind. In her 
specification of justice evaluation, Jasso distinguishes between unjust overreward and 
unjust underreward, the former referring to the situation where actual reward exceeds just 
reward while the latter being defined as the situation where actual reward is less than just 
reward. Measuring the magnitude of perceived injustice in these two situations allows us 
to differentiate the degree of injustice resulting from underreward and from overreward, 
and to capture the conceptual range of perceived injustice by looking at the deviations 
along the two opposite directions from the perfect justice. 
 
2.2 JUSTICE GAP 
It should be pointed out that the injustice perceived from an overreward of a 
certain amount is not equivalent to the injustice perceived from an underreward of the 
same amount (Jasso 1978). As an extension of Jasso’s work on justice evaluation, the 
justice gap refers to the difference between an individual’s justice evaluations of an 
overreward situation and an underreward situation. Verwiebe and Wegener (2000) 
introduced the concept of the justice gap in their empirical investigation of income 
inequality as the situation where a well-paid occupation is perceived as being unjustly 
overrewarded whereas a poorly-paid occupation is perceived as being unjustly 
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underrewarded. Individuals’ perception of the inequality in the income distribution is 
considered as consisting of specific comparisons between the actual and the ideal income 
for various positions in the income structure. These specific justice evaluations constitute 
individuals’ perception of the overall income distribution, and can be aggregated at 
different levels, for the distribution situation in certain occupations, in some social 
groups, or in the society as a whole.  
 
Figure 2.1 The Justice Gap 
 
Imagine the justice evaluation as a continuum from extremely unjust underreward 
to extremely unjust overreward (as shown in Figure 2.1). The degree of perceived 
injustice from the social income inequality should be the range of this continuum 
produced by the income distribution. Therefore, the difference in the justice evaluations 
of two extremes along the injustice continuum, referred to as extreme justice gap, is used 
here to reflect individuals’ justice perception of the social income inequality.  
 
2.3 SELF-INTEREST THEORY VS. ILLUSORY PERCEPTION PERSPECTIVE 
A great number of justice studies have shown that individuals perceive a given 
allocation situation differently in terms of how just or unjust they believe it to be. Do 
individuals also differ in the degree of injustice they perceive from the existing social 
9 
distribution? The investigation of factors leading to the variation in justice perceptions 
mainly focuses on individual factors such as demographic characteristics, personal beliefs 
or motivations activated in specific contexts, and how these factors influence individuals’ 
preference for certain justice rules. This research examines whether the perceived 
injustice from social inequality varies across different social positions. There are two 
theoretical perspectives that may provide the answer to the question: self-interest theory 
and illusory justice perception. 
Self-interest theory has often received the most substantial discussion and 
empirical support (e.g. Leventhal and Anderson 1970; Overlaet and Lagrou 1981). It is 
argued that individuals’ judgment of justice in the distribution of rewards depends on 
how much they benefit from the current allocation. Following the logic of self-interest 
theory, individuals tend to perceive an allocation as more fair when they are rewarded 
more, and as more unfair when they are rewarded less. This self-interest orientation also 
gives rise to the tendency for people to think they deserve more than others.  
Self-interest theory not only applies to local, specific allocation situation but also 
to general justice perceptions. For instance, higher status groups prefer equity as the 
distribution principle because allocation proportional to status can maximize their 
interest, whereas lower status groups prefer equality, which favors lower status people 
(Alves and Rossi 1978; Shepelak and Alwin 1986). According to self-interest theory, 
given the existing income inequality, the justice evaluation will differ by whether one is 
occupying an advantageous position in the income distribution structure. Therefore, 
individuals with high income would perceive the distribution as more fair than their low 
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income counterparts. In other words, the hypothesis derived from the self-interest theory 
is: 
 
Hypothesis A: High income people will perceive less injustice than low income people 
in the given income distribution. 
 
The second perspective comes from Wegener’s (1987, 1990) research about 
illusory perception, which shows that people’s perception of a social hierarchy or 
distribution is affected by their positions in the hierarchy. People with high status tend to 
assign higher prestige scores to those at the top of the hierarchy and lower prestige scores 
to those at the bottom, compared with people with low status (see Wegener 1987). This 
finding suggests that individuals are prone to perceive the hierarchy in favor of their self-
image. As such, those with low status subjectively shorten the range of the hierarchy (i.e. 
leveling), making themselves less distant to the top. In contrast, those with high status 
subjectively stretch the hierarchy (i.e. polarization), enlarging the distance to make 
themselves appear more privileged.  
The leveling and polarization tendencies stem from a self-image improving 
motivation.2 This self-image improving tendency is also salient in making justice 
evaluations. Previous studies have provided evidence that people tend to consider 
                                                           
2
 This should be differentiated with the motivation of presenting a good image in other’s eye. In 
distribution situations where actors would expect future interactions with others, those who made greater 
contributions often prefer equal distribution while those contributed less prefer equitable distribution 
(Shapiro 1975). This preference for a distribution rule that appears to counter their immediate self-interest, 
labeled as “politeness ritual” (Schwinger 1980), results from individuals’ expectation for future gains by 
maintaining good reputation. With regard to perceiving social inequality, there is no need for individuals to 
present such a friendly image to boost their gains as in a local allocation situation. 
11 
themselves as being approximately the average, and as being justly paid (Shepelak and 
Alwin 1986; Wegener 1987). Being overrewarded and underrewarded are both perceived 
as threats to one’s self-image, as the inequitable reward violates the code of fairness 
(Homans 1974; Hegtvedt 1990). Therefore, individuals are motivated to perceive 
themselves as being fairly paid, in other words, as located in the middle of the justice 
evaluation hierarchy.  
The subjective distortion of the justice evaluation hierarchy occurs relative to the 
perception of one’s own position. Since people with different income levels share the 
tendency to locate themselves somewhere in the middle, their justice perceptions of the 
income distribution are expected to be different, consistent with the polarization and 
leveling pattern discussed by Wegener (1987). High income individuals will subjectively 
lengthen the justice evaluation hierarchy, perceiving those with higher positions as being 
even more overrewarded and those below themselves as being underrewarded. By 
exaggerating the overreward level of the top rank, high income individuals can justify 
their relatively high income as reasonable compared to those at the top (being extremely 
overrewarded). Also, to put themselves in the middle range of the hierarchy, high income 
individuals tend to perceive those with lower position as being underrewarded. As those 
with relatively lower positions than high income people may still be objectively overpaid 
or justly paid, subjectively shifting them down to the lower position will consequently 
make the bottom rank even lower. Thus, with the motivation to enhance self-image, high 
income individuals will perceive a larger justice gap as they think that those at the top are 
even more unjustly overrewarded and that those with low income are compensated more 
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poorly. This perceptual polarization increases the injustice perceived by high income 
people.  
In contrast to the polarization tendency, low income people tend to level the 
justice evaluation hierarchy by shortening the distance between the top and the bottom. 
They have a tendency to narrow the gap to diminish their disadvantage, leading to the 
distorted perception that they are not as unjustly underrewarded as the objective, and to 
the underestimation of the unjust overreward level for those with higher positions. In the 
perception of the low income individuals, they are receiving approximately just pay, 
which means that they are somewhere in the average rank of the justice evaluation 
hierarchy. Those with lower positions than the low income individuals will be perceived 
as not so underrewarded, consequently elevate the bottom rank of the hierarchy. And the 
distance to the top is shrunk to make low income individuals appear less 
disadvantageous. Therefore, low income people will perceive a narrower justice gap as 
they subjectively shorten the justice evaluation hierarchy. Critically, low income 
individuals cannot simply adopt the same polarization approach as high income 
individuals because their major self-image improving concern is to diminish their 
disadvantage by shortening their distance to higher positions, rather than amplifying the 
distance to those at the bottom. So counter to hypothesis A, the hypothesis derived from 
the illusory perception perspective is: 
 
Hypothesis B: High income people will perceive more injustice than low income people 
in the given income distribution. 
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By examining how individuals with different structural positions perceive 
differently the injustice in the income distribution, the present study resolves the 
controversy between self-interest theory and illusory justice perception theory regarding 
how justice evaluation varies across social positions. Specifically, the justice gap is used 
to capture individuals’ perceived injustice and to see whether the magnitude of perceived 
injustice differs depending on perceiver’s position in the income distribution. If 
individuals’ justice perception of the income distribution does relate to their structural 
positions along the income hierarchy, then the question becomes of which pattern does 






DATA AND METHOD 
The study used data from the 2008 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS). The 
Gini Coefficient for China in 2008, as reported by the World Bank, is 0.4263, which 
indicates a relatively high level of inequality. Such an unequal income distribution should 
make it more likely that individuals in this society perceive substantial levels of 
inequality making it easier to detect people’s feelings of injustice. This allows the 
comparison of the difference as hypothesized in the justice perception between 
individuals occupying different social positions. The sample from 2008 CGSS includes 
3,010 adults (aged 18 and above) in China, with an average age of 43, and 52.2% of 
which are females.  
Questions were included in the survey asking how much respondents think a 
person in certain occupations actually earns and should earn. For instance, respondents 
were asked, “how much do you think a doctor actually earns?”, and then “how much do 
you think a doctor should earn?”. There are five occupations in the series of income 
estimate questions: a) central government minister; b) chairman of a national 
corporation4; c) medical doctor; d) sales assistant; e) unskilled manual worker, which 
vary in terms of occupational prestige. The discrepancy between the estimated actual 
earning and the just earning reveals whether the respondent thinks people in the target 
                                                           
3 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=1. 
4 A corporation that is national in scope. 
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occupation are generally overcompensated, undercompensated, or fairly compensated. 
The justice gap, comparing the justice perception in over-compensated and under-
compensated situations, provides the information about respondents’ perceived level of 
inequality and desired level of inequality regarding income distribution. 
 
3.1 THE JUSTICE EVALUATION FUNCTION 
The justice gap is measured using the justice evaluation function developed by 
Jasso (1978, 1980), based on the idea that justice perception comes from the comparison 
between actual and expected rewards. The magnitude of injustice perceived is thus 
dependent on how far away the actual allocation is from the perfect justice (see Jasso 
1978, 1980): 
 
Justice evaluation=ln (actual reward/ just reward) 
 
In this function, actual reward is what the recipient actually gets (or how much the 
perceiver believes the recipient actually gets) in a particular distribution situation. Just 
reward refers to the amount that the evaluator (i.e., the perceiver) believes the recipient 
should receive. The natural logarithm operator accounts for the empirical finding that 
underreward is regarded as more unfair than overreward of the same amount (Jasso 1978; 
Shepelak and Alwin 1986; Alwin 1987). When actual reward matches just reward, the 
ratio in the function becomes 1, and the justice evaluation will equal to zero, representing 
perfect justice. Deviation from such a perfect justice point produces feelings of injustice. 
Specifically, when actual reward exceeds just reward, the justice evaluation is positive, 
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meaning that injustice is perceived from overrewarding situation. For situations of 
underreward, the value of justice evaluation is negative as the actual reward amount is 
smaller than just reward. The larger the difference between actual reward and just reward, 
the larger the absolute value of justice evaluation, the more injustice is perceived. 
In terms of occupational earnings in the current study, the justice evaluation is 
specified as the natural log of the ratio of estimated actual earnings to just earnings given 
by respondents. How unjust respondents perceive the earning for a particular occupation 
is indicated by the discrepancy between the amount they believe that occupation is 
actually paid and should be paid. The logarithm form indicates the property that 
underreward is felt more keenly than overreward of the same amount (Jasso 1978; 
Wagner and Berger 1985). The justice evaluation scores are computed for 2,054 
respondents who made complete income estimations for the five target occupations. 
Those who didn’t give answers to one or more of the income estimation questions (956 
respondents in the survey sample) are excluded5. Among the five justice evaluation 
scores for each respondent, the maximum and the minimum are selected out to compute 
the range of individuals’ justice evaluation.  
Table 3.1 presents the frequency for each target occupation being selected as 
producing the maximum or the minimum justice evaluation scores. The maximum justice 
evaluation score tends to be found in estimates for occupations higher in prestige: central 
government minister and chairman of a national corporation. And the minimum justice 
evaluation score for about 60% respondents is their evaluation for unskilled manual 
workers. Recall that the justice evaluation measure maps a continuum ranging from being 
                                                           
5 The missing cases in income estimates were checked using Heckman’s selection model (see Heckman 
1979). The result indicates no selection bias. 
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unjustly underrewarded to unjustly overrewarded. The numbers reported in Table 3.1 
show a tendency for individuals to perceive people in higher prestige occupations being 
overrewarded and lower prestige occupations being underrewarded. 
 
Table 3.1 Frequency of Occupations with the Max and the Min Justice Evaluations 
Occupation 
 
Selected as the Maximuma  Selected as the Minimum 
 Frequency Percent (%)  Frequency Percent (%) 
Central government 
minister 
 682 33.20  204 9.93 
Chairman of a 
national corporation  
 499 24.29  163 7.94 
Medical doctor  192 9.35  259 12.61 
Sales assistant  367 17.87  193 9.40 
Unskilled manual 
worker 
 314 15.29  1235 60.13 
Note: N=2054.  
 a Being selected as the maximum indicates that the occupation is perceived by the respondent to be 
the most overcompensated among the five target occupations. 
 
For each respondent, the difference between the highest and the lowest justice 
evaluation score represents this person’s perception of the justice gap, which captures 
how much injustice from both underreward and overreward is perceived in the income 
distribution. The larger the justice gap, the more injustice one perceives.  
Questions may be raised about using respondents’ estimation of earnings as the 
actual earnings to compute the justice evaluation since we cannot assume that people 
make accurate estimation of occupational earnings. Previous studies have found that 
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people generally perceive the income distribution inaccurately (e.g. Eriksson and 
Simpson 2012; Chambers et al. 2014), and their perception of others’ earnings may be 
determined by what they think of as ideal earnings6 (Headey 1991). However, the focus 
in this study is the perceived discrepancy between the actual earning and the just earning 
in people’s mind rather than the objective difference, because respondents’ emotional or 
behavioral response is based on their perception, although it might be inaccurate of the 
reality. In other words, individuals’ attitudes or behaviors are directly affected by their 
perception of the reality, not the reality per se. When asked to estimate the actual 
earnings, respondents were not given the information about the objective earnings of the 
target occupations. Their answers are relative to the amount they think of as ideal or just 
in mind, and the discrepancy between the two reflects the injustice respondents 
perceived, instead of how much injustice objectively exists. Therefore, respondents’ 
estimated earnings for various occupations are used to compute justice evaluation values.  
The operationalization of the justice gap here is different from Verwiebe and 
Wegener’s (2000) in their study where justice gap is computed as the arithmetic 
difference between the justice evaluation scores for two occupations, “chairman of a 
large company” and “unskilled manual worker”, assuming these two occupations are 
located at the extremes of the income continuum. Their approach, however, neglects that 
respondents might not necessarily think CEOs are overcompensated and unskilled 
workers are undercompensated although they perceive injustice generally regarding to the 
overall income distribution. As presented in Table 3.1, although high prestige 
occupations tend to produce the maximum justice evaluation score, still 15.29% of 
                                                           
6 Or vice-versa as argued by some other scholars (e.g. Jasso 1980). 
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respondents perceived unskilled workers to be most overcompensated. And 7.94% of 
respondents evaluate CEOs as being the most undercompensated. Therefore, it’s 
unwarranted to assume that particular occupations are consensually considered as 
overcompensated or undercompensated. Relying heavily on individuals’ perception of 
two specific occupations may also introduce bias due to personal attitudes toward the 
target occupations. To avoid these shortcomings, the present study takes the arithmetic 
difference between the maximum and the minimum of justice evaluation scores across all 
the target occupations for each respondent, which better reflects the extent to which 
respondents perceive injustice in the income distribution.  
 
3.2 INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
The independent variable, “logwage”, is the natural log of respondents’ reported 
wage income, used as the indicator of their relative positions in the income hierarchy. 
This transformation implies that one money unit difference weights more in the lower 
positions than in the higher positions along the income hierarchy. For instance, the 
structural distance between one person earning 20,000 dollars and the other earning 
50,000 will be farther than the distance between one earning 100,000 dollars and the 
other earning 130,000, although the money unit difference is the exactly the same for 
both cases. As in a pay raise situation, a 30,000 money unit difference would mean much 
more for a person earning 20,000 dollars (30,000/20,000 = 150%) than for one earning 
100,000 dollars (30,000/100,000 = 30%). To be more clearly understood, the difference 
of income should be expressed as a percent rather than a raw value. In this case, the value 
difference between ln(20,000) and ln(50,000) is about 0.92, while the difference between 
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ln(100,000) and ln(130,000) is 0.27. To get a pay raise of as equal effect as an increase 
from 20,000 to 50,000 dollars, a person earning 100,000 dollars would need to get a raise 
of 150% (ln(250,000) – ln(100,000) = 0.92). As such, the difference between positions 
along the income hierarchy is better presented by the log-transformed unit. 
To better understand the difference in justice perception of income inequality, 
individuals’ satisfaction level with their wage income is also included. The relationship 
between income level and pay satisfaction has been widely acknowledged and generally 
high income people are more likely to feel satisfied with their pay. This study also 
explores whether the effect of income on pay satisfaction can further impact on 
individuals’ perception of the income distribution. Pay satisfaction was measured in a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1-very unsatisfied to 5-very satisfied. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables (N=2054) Mean SD Min Max 
Justice Gap 1.429 1.126 0 6.733 
Logwagea 2.193 1.151 -1.609 6.908 
Year of Schooling 9.713 3.696 1 20 
Age 41.968 13.874 18 84 
Sex (Female =1) 49.66  0 1 
Pay Satisfaction 3.27 0.919 1 5 
       Note: a Logwage= ln(wage income) 
 
Three demographic characteristics, year of schooling, age and gender, are 
included as control variables in the model7. Previous studies on distributive justice have 
                                                           
7 Based on the findings of some previous comparative studies, political ideology and cultural orientation 
might also impact people’s perception of social inequality (e.g. Leung and Bond 1984; Tetlock et al. 1993; 
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examined but failed to find consistent results regarding the effect of age and gender on 
individuals’ preference for distribution rules (see Hegtvedt and Cook 2001). Without 
consistent results from research about age, models are specified respectively for linear 
and curvilinear effect of age. Females are proposed as less self-oriented than males in 
allocating rewards, but in tasks that females are culturally considered as more competent, 
they turn out to prefer equity as the distribution rule. These variables potentially relate to 
individuals’ justice perception, thus are included as controls. Table 3.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model.  
The data were analyzed with OLS regression models, first including the income 
variable and the controls, and then adding pay satisfaction to the model. The result can 
indicate whether respondents’ wage income impacts their perception of justice gap. And 
more importantly, to address the controversy between Hypothesis A and Hypothesis B, 
the result can directly answer the question about whether individuals’ income is 
positively or negatively associated with the justice gap. And the analysis with pay 
satisfaction would help us to understand the relationship between individuals’ income 
and the amount of inequality they perceived from the income distribution. 
 
                                                           
Chambers et al. 2014). However, as the present study is focusing on the sample in China, where the 





RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 JUSTICE EVALUATION 
Recall that for each of the five target occupations, each respondent gave his or her 
estimates of the actual income and the just income, from which a justice evaluation score 
is computed. Table 4.1 presents the mean actual and just earnings given by respondents, 
together with the mean justice evaluation scores for the target occupations. Occupational 
prestige scores in Table 4.1 are assigned using Treiman’s Standard International 
Occupational Prestige scale8 (SIOP; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996).  
Occupations with high prestige are perceived as having higher income level and 
deserving more than low prestige occupations, as the mean income estimates for central 
government minister and CEO are much larger than those for unskilled manual worker. 
On average, the estimated actual income for the CEO of a national corporation is nearly 
30 times the pay for an unskilled manual worker, and the just income for CEO is about 
9.5 times the amount considered just for unskilled manual worker.   
The mean justice evaluation scores in Table 4.1 show that high prestige 
occupations are perceived as being unjustly overrewarded, and that the magnitude of 
injustice perceived tends to be larger for those top-ranked occupations. In other words, 
the difference between actual income and just income for top prestige occupations is 
                                                           
8 No standard occupational prestige scale available specific for China. Treiman’s SIOP scale is used since 
it’s developed as comparative across countires, and also found to be highly consistent with prestige ratings 
by Chinese sample in previous studies (Lin and Xie 1998; Bian 1996). 
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much greater than the others, as people think ministers and CEOs are earning a lot more 
than they should. Among the five occupations, unskilled manual worker is the only one 
with a negative justice evaluation score, which indicates that it is perceived as being 
unjustly underrewarded on average.  
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Note: a Treiman’s Standard International Occupational Prestige (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). 
          b Unit of income: 1,000 yuan (RMB); Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Another pattern is observed based on the standard deviations in Table 4.1. High 
prestige occupations not only have higher income estimates, but also show greater 
variance. Especially for central government minister and CEO of a national corporation, 
the standard deviations of the actual income estimates are respectively 1077.77 and 
13275.29, which are extremely large compared with the others. This provides some 
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evidence that people are more uncertain about the income level of those who are located 
at the top of occupational prestige hierarchy, hence typically more socially distant. 
Do people of different income levels differ in the income estimates? The 
judgment of how much people in particular occupations should earn reflects the 
perception of a hierarchy of deservingness. Based on Wegener’s illusory perception 
theory (1987, 1990), compared with low income individuals, high income individuals 
will think those in high-prestige occupations deserve even more and those in low-prestige 
occupations deserve even less. So following the logic of the polarization and levelling 
distortion, for high prestige occupations, the just income estimates given by high income 
individuals should be greater than those given by low income individuals; whereas, for 
low prestige occupations, the rich will give lower just income estimates than the poor. 
For three of the five target occupations, the just income estimates are positively 
associated with respondents’ wage income (for Medical doctor: b=12.48, p<0.001; Sales 
assistant: b=10.33, p<0.01; Unskilled manual worker: b=4.36, p<0.001). The actual 
income estimates for medical doctor and unskilled manual worker are also positively 
related to respondent’s income level. This suggests that overall high income people give 
larger income estimates, for both high and low prestige occupations. But the effect of 
income on the people’s perception of the income distribution cannot be directly inferred 
from the results of the just and actual income estimates. The justice evaluation as the 
discrepancy between the actual and the just income controls for the individual variations 
in terms of raw monetary values and allows us to examine the net effect of people’s 




4.2 REGRESSION MODELS 
To investigate the proposed effect of individuals’ wage income on their justice 
perception of income distribution, the data were first analyzed using OLS regressions 
with logwage and control variables and then including a quadratic term for age (Model 1 
and Model 2 in Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Regressions on Justice Gap  








































R2 0.007 0.010 .0188 
N 1553 1553 1237a 
           Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses. 
                           a N decreases in Model 3 due to the pay satisfaction variable. The survey question about 






Logwage turns out to have a significantly negative effect on perceived justice gap 
(b=-0.07, p<0.05). According to the regression result, one unit increase in logwage will 
lead to 0.07 unit decrease in the perceived justice gap, which indicates that individuals 
with higher income will perceive smaller justice gap. This finding confirms the 
hypothesis derived from self-interest theory: High income people perceive less injustice 
than those with low income. And obviously, this result also contradicts the prediction 
derived from Wegener’s theory of levelling and polarization tendencies. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The Relationship between Age and Justice Gap 
 
Among the control variables, age is found to have a curvilinear relationship with 
perceived justice gap, presented in Figure 4.1. As age increases, the justice gap becomes 
larger for individuals in their early adulthood. This positive effect of age is diminishing 
gradually as it gets closer to the middle-age range. For individuals with age over 50, the 
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increase in age will reversely lead to a decline in perceived justice gap. And for those 
passing the turning point, the rate of decline in justice gap by age also becomes greater as 
age increases. Overall, middle-age individuals perceive more injustice from the income 
distribution than young adults and the elderly. 
 
4.3 MEDIATION OF PAY SATISFACTION 
Pay satisfaction, which is included in Model 3, turns out to be negatively related 
to the perceived justice gap (b=-0.094, p<0.01). This suggests that people who feel more 
satisfied with their job pay tend to perceive narrower justice gap for the income 
distribution. Taken together with the relationship between income level and pay 
satisfaction, the result signals a potential mediation effect of pay satisfaction linking 
logwage and justice gap.  
 
Figure 4.2 Mediation of Pay Satisfaction 
 
The Sobel test is used to examine the mediation effect. The result, as presented in 
Figure 4.2, shows that logwage has a significant direct effect (b=0.192, p< 0.001) on pay 
satisfaction, and also a significantly negative effect (b=-0.071, p<0.05) on perceived 
justice gap. Additionally, pay satisfaction is found to significantly influence (b=-0.093, 
p<0.01) individuals’ perceived justice gap. The indirect effect of logwage (b=-0.018, 
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p<0.05) through pay satisfaction is significant, taking up 20% of its total effect (b=-
0.089, p<0.01) on justice gap.  
High income people have a narrower justice gap partially because high income 
leads to high pay satisfaction level, which reduces the injustice they perceive from 
general distribution. For the effect of individuals’ income on perceived justice gap, about 
one-fifth is carried indirectly through pay satisfaction, so the major part is still the direct 
effect. Based on the results, people with one unit higher income will directly narrow their 
justice gap by 0.071, and have a 0.192 increase in their pay satisfaction. One unit increase 
in pay satisfaction leads to a 0.093 decrease in justice gap. Therefore, one-unit higher 
income indirectly results in a 0.018 decrease in justice gap through its effect on pay 
satisfaction. In total, people with one unit higher wage income will perceive a 0.089 







This study uses the justice gap to capture the injustice individuals perceive in the 
income distribution, and finds evidence for the negative relationship between individuals’ 
income and the magnitude of perceived injustice as derived from self-interest theory. 
People with high income tend to have a narrower justice gap, indicating less injustice 
perceived. In other words, high income individuals do not see those who are 
undercompensated as suffering from as much injustice as low income individuals do. 
And compared with high income individuals, low income individuals think people in 
overcompensated occupations are overpaid to a larger extent. In short, low income people 
perceive more injustice than high income people of the given income distribution.  
On a broader view, the effect of income level on the perceived justice gap 
suggests that individuals’ perception of social inequality is shaped by the social structure 
they are embedded in. Out of self-interest concerns, people located in higher positions of 
the income distribution would be more willing to think the existing income distribution is 
somewhat fair in order to justify their high income, while those in lower positions would 
exaggerate the injustice, showing that they deserve much more than they actually earn. 
The justice perception is thus distorted with the self-interest motivations, presenting 
different tendencies based on individuals’ structural positions. In short, what we see 
depends on where we stand.  
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The linkage between structural positions and justice perception also underlies the 
illusory justice perception perspective. However, the hypothesis derived from this 
perspective is rejected by the result of this study. Then it emerges the question why the 
justice perception is distorted in a way that follows the self-interest pattern, rather than 
the polarization and leveling pattern, although these two theoretical perspectives both use 
the structural position as the explaining factor for distorted perceptions.  
One possible reason for the failure of Wegener’s illusory perception perspectives 
in predicting justice gap is that justice evaluation doesn’t fall in the scope of the theory. 
It’s uncertain since Wegener is not explicit about the definition of “social hierarchy 
scaling” or the scope to which his theory can be applied. Income, prestige, and “social 
importance” are mentioned as examples of qualified social hierarchy in Wegener’s 
studies (1987, 1990). The important difference between those example hierarchies and 
justice evaluation is that people will always prefer higher income, prestige or social 
importance, but not higher positions in a justice evaluation hierarchy. Scholars in 
distributive justice have widely recognized that perceived injustice will cause negative 
emotional reactions – anger for injustice perceived from being underrewarded and guilt 
for injustice perceived from being overrewarded (see Hegtvedt 1990). As discussed 
earlier, justice evaluation captures a hierarchy ranging from extremely unjust 
underreward up to extremely unjust overreward. High positions along the justice 
evaluation hierarchy, though manifesting advantage or high prestige, also give rise to 
negative feelings. Thus, we cannot assume a “the higher, the better” preference in the 
justice evaluation scenario. For people with high position along the justice evaluation 
hierarchy, especially those at the top, although the tendency to perceive oneself as the 
 
31 
average exists, it may be difficult to justify their pay and portray themselves as being 
fairly compensated because that perception contradicts the reality to a very great extent. 
So they will perceive themselves being overrewarded, but leaning toward the middle 
range. The polarization, which lengthens the hierarchy, will instead make them appeared 
even more overrewarded compared to those at the bottom, and thus produce more intense 
guilty feelings. So the distortion in the perception doesn’t present the polarization pattern.  
Individuals’ preference for higher positions may be fundamental to the illusory 
perception theory, in which perception of a hierarchy is distorted by high status 
individuals to subjectively amplify their superiority, and by low status individuals to 
subjectively diminish their disadvantage. Underlying the distortion tendencies is that 
higher position in the hierarchy is always preferred, no negative byproduct associated 
with superior positions. Therefore, as individuals do not always enjoy being unjustly 
overrewarded, the justice evaluation doesn’t satisfy a possibly overlooked scope 
condition in Wegener’s theory that higher positions in the hierarchy are always preferred. 
This may explain why the distortion of justice perception by structural positions does 
follow the polarization and leveling pattern. 
Based on the results, pay satisfaction significantly mediates the effect of income 
on perceived justice gap. High income leads to high level of pay satisfaction, and this 
satisfaction feeling further impacts the perceived inequality in the income distribution. 
Specifically, people with high income feel more satisfied with their pay, and thus 
perceive less injustice in the income distribution. In contrast, people with low income 
tend to feel less satisfied with their earnings and perceive more injustice. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that there is still a major direct effect of individuals’ income on their 
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justice perception of the income distribution. The mediation of pay satisfaction can only 
explain part of the story.  
In addition to the theoretical contribution, the findings of this study also bear 
empirical implications. Individuals’ perception of social inequality can influence their 
attitudes toward redistribution policies. As suggested by the study result, people with 
high income tend to perceive less injustice in the general distribution because of their 
high positions in the income hierarchy. This implies that higher social status people may 
turn out to be less supportive than lower status people toward some redistribution 
policies, because they do not see as much injustice in the existing distribution as low 
status people do. Also, since people in higher positions are very likely possessing more 
political power, their underestimation of the injustice will impact the political effort to 
reduce social inequality. Instead of being Machiavellian schemers, the so-called top 1% 
may oppose the redistribution policies simply because they truly believe the current 
distribution of wealth is reasonably fair.  
There still exist some limitations in the present study and room for future 
research. First, a simple income variable is used to indicate individuals’ structural 
position in the income distribution, and then examine its effect on perceptions of social 
inequality. It can be argued that the structural position should contain more social 
dimensions than just individuals’ income. In order to be comparable to the previous study 
done by Wegener (1987, 1990) about distorted justice perception, this study uses only 
income variable. Future research can try with combining salient variables to construct a 
more informative position factor. Second, the regression results show that gender and 
education variables controlled in the models are not significant, while the constant is 
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apparently extremely significant. This indicates that there is a lot of variance in 
individuals’ perceived justice gap remain unaccounted for by the variables included. 
Since the goal of this study is to test the relationship between structural position and the 
perceived injustice, rather than explaining the perceived justice gap, the effort of 
exploring other potential explanatory factors is left for future research along this 
direction. For instance, political affiliation, cultural orientation and distribution rule 
preference may have impact on how much injustice one perceives from the general 
distribution. Third, as discussed above, the rejection of the illusory justice perception 
hypothesis seems to signal a neglected scope condition of Wegener’s theory, but it’s not 
tested in the study. To confirm this potential assumption for the illusory justice 
perception perspective, some evidence should be provided by research investigating 
systematic difference in perception of social hierarchies in which higher positions are 
always preferred, and of hierarchies where higher positions are not necessarily positively 
valued. This exploration of potential scope conditions result from the unsuccessful 
application of a theory can also remind us of the importance of explicit definitions and 
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